Advocate-Client Privilege, Professional Misconduct Under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, and the ‘Clean Hands’ Doctrine — Explained (2026 INSC 907)
INTRODUCTION
When can an advocate break client confidentiality to defend his own reputation? The Supreme Court answered this question with unusual bluntness in its judgment dated 21 August 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 12256 of 2025, Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddiquee, reported as 2026 INSC 907. The case reached a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi through three connected proceedings arising out of a Bar Council of India disciplinary order. What makes the judgment worth reading is not only its finding on professional misconduct, but its refusal to reward either side for years of what the Court itself described as suppression, embellishment and afterthought. This article breaks down the facts, the Court’s reasoning, and what it means for the duty of confidentiality that every advocate owes a client — including one who has since become an adversary.
BACKGROUND: HOW A LEGAL NOTICE TURNED INTO A TELEVISION SPECTACLE
The appellant, Rehana Khan, engaged the respondent, an advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, for part of 2013 and 2014. In 2013, following a dispute with her brother, she came into contact with a senior police officer while at a police station and later alleged that he had attempted to sexually assault her under the guise of helping her. Acting on her instructions, or so he maintained, the respondent’s office issued a legal notice to the officer on 15 July 2014. Exactly whose instructions produced that notice became one of the central disputes in the case — the appellant said it was sent without her authority; the respondent said it was drafted from material she herself supplied and sent on her instructions.
On 24 July 2014, the appellant lodged a First Information Report against the police officer alleging offences under Sections 376(2), 376C, 354 and 354D of the Indian Penal Code, and named the respondent in it as a person acting under the officer’s influence. Four days later, she appeared before the media with her face covered and spoke about her case. Then, on 5 August 2014, the respondent gave his own television interview — broadcast on Aaj Tak and Zee News — in which he discussed his relationship with the appellant, played recorded conversations between them, and material said to be their message exchanges was also aired. His office was searched by investigators on 13 August 2014, and that search too made it to television the next day.
The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 before the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa in February 2015, which was eventually taken up by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India. In August 2025 — more than a decade after the events — the Committee found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct on three counts: issuing the notice without authority, disclosing confidential information that led to the appellant’s identification in the media, and making derogatory public remarks about her. It suspended him from practice for two years, fined him Rs. 3 lakh payable to the appellant, and directed a further Rs. 2 lakh to the BCI’s Welfare Fund.
THE THREE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Both parties were unhappy with this outcome, and between them they generated three separate proceedings before the Supreme Court. The appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 12256 of 2025 seeking enhancement of the punishment. The respondent first challenged the same order before the Bombay High Court under Article 226, and that writ petition was later transferred to the Supreme Court and registered as Transferred Case (Civil) No. 30 of 2026. He also filed a separate Civil Appeal No. 7959 of 2026 against the same disciplinary order. All three were heard together, along with an application impleading the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa as a party.
ISSUE ONE: DID THE ADVOCATE COMMIT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT?
The respondent’s central defence was that he was no longer the appellant’s counsel by the time of his television interview, that he had already been named in her FIR and was fielding relentless media attention as a result, and that his interview was purely defensive — an attempt to answer accusations, not to attack her. The Court was not persuaded. It held that an advocate’s duty of confidentiality is not conditional on a client’s continued good behaviour toward the advocate, and that the fact she had become his adversary made no difference to that duty.
The Court was equally clear about what an advocate who feels falsely accused should do instead. He may place his version before the investigating agency — as the respondent himself did on 4 August 2014 — or he may sue for defamation. What he cannot do is go to a television channel, disclose privileged communications from the professional relationship, play recorded conversations with a former client, and publicly brand her complaint a false case while accusing her of seeking publicity. On this finding alone, the Court held, the case for professional misconduct was made out and sufficient to sustain the punishment already imposed.
The respondent also argued that the Disciplinary Committee’s order was passed ex parte, without proper notice to his correct address, and that this vitiated the entire proceeding. The Court rejected this too. The record showed he had entered appearance, filed a written statement, was represented by counsel, and participated in recording evidence throughout. An advocate who was present at every stage, the Court observed, cannot later claim he was absent — a ground it described as an afterthought raised for want of a better one.
ISSUE TWO: WHY THE COMPLAINANT DIDN’T GET A HARSHER PUNISHMENT
Given the misconduct finding, one might expect the Court to have gone further and enhanced the punishment as the appellant wanted — permanent removal from the roll, and compensation of Rs. 2 crore. It did not, and its reasoning here is the part of the judgment advocates and litigants alike should pay close attention to.
The Court invoked what is often called the clean hands doctrine — the principle that a party asking a court to enlarge relief in its favour must itself have been candid with the court. It found the appellant wanting on this score. Material on record, including exchanges she herself relied upon, suggested that during the engagement she and the respondent had discussed ways to trap the police officer, which the Court said was not the conduct of a client merely seeking legal advice. She had also appeared before the media herself on 28 July 2014 and spoken about her case, even though her grievance was that her case had been made public. And the underlying criminal case against the police officer had ended in his discharge in December 2015 — an order she never challenged and which had attained finality. On this footing, her appeal for enhancement was dismissed along with the respondent’s two proceedings, and the Bar Council of India’s original order was left undisturbed.
KEY LEGAL PRINCIPLES THIS JUDGMENT ESTABLISHES
1. The duty of confidentiality survives the end of the engagement. An advocate cannot use information received in confidence against a former client, even after the relationship has turned adversarial.
2. Disclosing privileged client communications to the media is professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 — irrespective of provocation.
3. An advocate who believes he has been falsely accused has proper remedies: a statement to the investigating agency, or a defamation suit. A press interview disclosing client confidences is not one of them.
4. Participation throughout disciplinary proceedings — written statement, representation by counsel, recorded evidence — forecloses a later claim of denial of fair hearing based on non-service of notice.
5. The clean hands doctrine applies with equal force to a complainant seeking enhancement of punishment in a disciplinary appeal, not just to a respondent defending one.
6. Constitutional courts can and will impose costs on both sides in disciplinary appeals where the record shows years of suppression or embellishment by either party, regardless of who ultimately succeeds.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR PRACTISING ADVOCATES
For advocates, the practical lesson is straightforward: the professional obligation of confidentiality does not have an expiry date tied to the client’s conduct. A client who turns hostile, files a complaint, or names the advocate in an FIR does not release the advocate from the duty owed to her during the engagement. Reputation management through a television interview is not a recognised professional remedy, and the Bar Council of India — and now the Supreme Court — treats it as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor. Advocates dealing with media scrutiny arising from a client relationship would do well to route their response through the investigating agency or through legal proceedings such as a defamation suit, rather than through a press appearance that risks disclosing privileged material.
For litigants and complainants, the judgment is a reminder that appellate courts scrutinise the complainant’s own conduct just as closely as the respondent’s, particularly when the complainant is asking the court to go further than the tribunal below. Partial candour, selective disclosure, or an unchallenged adverse finding elsewhere in the same set of facts can all weigh against a request for enhanced relief.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
Q: Can an advocate ever speak to the media about a client or former client?
Generally, no — not about matters covered by the professional relationship. An advocate may respond to accusations made against him personally, including through a formal statement to investigators or through legal action such as defamation, but disclosing a client’s confidential communications or privileged material to the press is professional misconduct, as this judgment confirms.
Q: Does the duty of confidentiality end once a client becomes hostile or accuses the advocate of wrongdoing?
No. The Supreme Court was explicit that the duty is not conditional on the client’s continued good behaviour toward the advocate. Even where the client has named the advocate in an FIR, the advocate remains bound not to use information received in confidence against her.
Q: What is Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961?
Section 35 empowers State Bar Councils to refer complaints of professional or other misconduct against an advocate to a Disciplinary Committee, which can, after inquiry, dismiss the complaint, reprimand the advocate, suspend him from practice for a period, or remove his name from the roll of advocates altogether.
Q: What punishment did the respondent ultimately receive?
The original Bar Council of India order — a two-year suspension from practice plus fines of Rs. 3 lakh to the complainant and Rs. 2 lakh to the BCI Welfare Fund — was upheld in full. The Supreme Court neither enhanced nor reduced it.
Q: Can a Bar Council of India disciplinary order be appealed directly to the Supreme Court?
Yes. Under the Advocates Act, an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India is appealable directly to the Supreme Court, which is why this case reached the apex court without passing through a High Court appeal — though, as this judgment shows, one party also attempted a parallel writ petition, which was ultimately transferred and dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddiquee is a rare judgment in which the Supreme Court declined to give either party the vindication it sought, and said so in plain terms. Its lasting contribution is the clarity it brings to a question every advocate eventually confronts: what to do when a former client turns accuser. The answer, per the Court, is not a television interview. It is restraint, and if necessary, the ordinary remedies of law — a statement to investigators, or a defamation suit — neither of which requires breaching the confidence a client once placed in you.
Rehana Khan v. Rizwan Siddiquee, Civil Appeal No. 12256 of 2025 with connected matters, 2026 INSC 907 (SC, 21 August 2026)